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The possibility that normative motivations 
are basic or psychologically primitive is an 
intriguing one worthy of more attention. On the 
one hand, there is a powerful case that human 
minds are equipped with a psychological system 
dedicated to norms and norm-guided behavior 
(Setman & Kelly, forthcoming). On the other 
hand, there has not yet been a convincing case 
made that there are any distinct, sui generis 
motivational resources that are unique or 
exclusive to this system. To the extent that the 
issue is addressed, many discussions simply 
proceed as if the motivations that drive different 
norm-guided behaviors are drawn from a number 
of different and more basic psychological 
sources. However, I do not think the possibility 
that some normative motivations are 
psychologically primitive has been ruled out. 
My modest aim in this piece is to frame and 
illuminate some of the issues surrounding 
normative motivation, rather than take a firm 
position on any of them. I begin by clarifying the 
key terms in my title of this essay, and unpacking 
some of the assumptions that underpin its 
question. I then distinguish four kinds of answers 
one might give. In this short essay I will not be 
able to properly develop and evaluate an 
argument for the view that normative motivations 
 
1 Thanks to Michael Brownstein, Peter Carruthers, 
Taylor Davis, Jeffrey Jensen, Alex Madva, Cain Todd, 
and Eric Walle for very helpful feedback on earlier 
versions of this. Thanks also to the participants in the 
Emotional Norms Conference held at University of 
Sheffield in July of 2020 for excellent conversations 
are psychologically primitive, but I will have 
some comments about what such an argument 
might look like, and what it would have to show. 
 
Spotlight on Internalized Norms 
Norms are the often informal rules that 
structure human behavior, regulating what is 
appropriate, required, prohibited, or permitted. 
Such rules govern human activities ranging from 
dress codes and workplace hierarchies to mate 
selection and courtship traditions; from dining 
practices and conversational etiquette to family 
dynamics and religious rituals (Henrich, 2015; 
Bicchieri, 2016; Gelfand, 2018). Researchers 
have produced a number of taxonomies that 
classify norms, some by reference to the 
behaviors they govern (sartorial norms, dining 
norms, conversational norms), others by 
reference to the values they help realize (care 
norms, purity norms, individualistic norms), and 
still others by reference to the ways in which they 
are stabilized (conventional norms, descriptive 
norms, injunctive norms) (see O’Neill, 2017). 
Norms can also be distinguished by reference to 
the functional role they occupy in the 
psychological economy of an individual person. 
Here a key notion is that of an internalized 
norm. The notion has a venerable history in 
anthropology and sociology, and has recently 
been taken up by cognitive scientists, 
evolutionists, and behavioral economists. For 
example, Gintis (2003) describes internalized 
norms as “enforced in part by internal sanctions, 
including shame, guilt and loss of self-esteem, as 
opposed to purely external sanctions, such as 
material rewards and punishments” (p. 407). In a 
recent paper modeling the kinds of evolutionary 
dynamics that might have produced the capacity 
to internalize norms, Gavrilets and Richerson 
(2017) state that “Certain norms are internalized, 
that is, acting according to a norm becomes an 
end in itself rather than merely a tool in achieving 
certain goals or avoiding social sanctions” (p. 1). 
Finally, Henrich and Ensminger (2014) 
about this material, especially Luca Barlassina, 







characterize internalized norms in terms of their 
“emotional, or motivational, aspect,” claiming 
that these are marked by the fact that the “desire 
to adhere to norms and to see them enforced 
appears to be internally motivated in some 
fashion. Once internalized, norms become 
ultimate ends, goals, or values in themselves” (p. 
22). While they differ in the specifics, all of these 
descriptions share the idea that a norm has been 
internalized by a person when it comes to bear a 
special kind of connection to her motivational 
apparatus. Moreover, they all depict that 
connection as rather direct and robust, suggesting 
that a person’s impetus to follow a norm she has 
internalized is insulated from other influences. 
Relative to rules she has not internalized, her 
motivation to conform to an internalized norm is 
less affected by, for example, the presence or 
absence of material rewards or punishments, the 
likelihood of social sanction from others, or 
changes to other relevant aspects of her external 
environment. 
Indeed, the category of an internalized norm 
is often brought into focus by appeal to other 
categories of rules whose members are likewise 
not distinguished by their content, but rather by 
the different way they are related to an 
individual’s psychological makeup. Consider an 
example of what can be called an incentivized 
norm. Imagine someone who loves to drive fast, 
but stays under a 55 mph speed limit to avoid 
getting a ticket or losing her driver’s license. If 
the limit goes up to 80 mph, or if the driver enters 
a section of the highway she knows is empty of 
police, she will no longer be motivated to stay 
below 55, and will indulge her need for speed. 
Such examples illustrate that people follow some 
rules merely as a means to something else, some 
outcome or consequence beyond the rule itself. In 
more familiar terms, a person is only 
instrumentally motivated to comply with her 
incentivized norms, and if the external incentives 
change or disappear, then so too does a person’s 
proximate motivation to comply with the rule. It 
is tempting to describe these as cases in which the 
person is motivated to follow the rule “by” the 
incentive, but this is slightly misleading. Strictly 
speaking, the most proximate motivator of the 
person’s behavior isn’t the external incentive 
itself, but still some internal psychological state 
or other. Incentivized norms differ from 
internalized norms is that in the former case, 
whatever the relevant motivating state (a desire, a 
fear, a goal, etc.), that state is more directly 
sensitive to the presence or absence of the 
external incentive than it is to the internally 
represented rule. 
Turning to internalized norms, the idea of 
internalization can be further developed by 
appeal to a norm system. There is a growing case 
that human minds have an evolved capacity 
dedicated to norms and norm guided behavior 
(Chudek & Henrich, 2011; House et al., 2019; 
Kelly & Davis, 2018; Kelly & Stich, 2007; 
Mikhail, 2011; Nichols, 2004, forthcoming; 
O’Neill & Machery, 2018; Richerson & Boyd, 
2005; Sripada & Stich 2007; Tomasello, 2016). 
While many details remain to be settled, the norm 
system can be thought of a package of 
psychological mechanisms that undergird a 
capacity to “do” norms. This capacity is marked 
by a person’s propensities to detect and acquire 
the behavior-guiding rules prevalent in her social 
environment, to keep her own behavior in 
conformity with those norms, and to enforce 
norms by sanctioning those who violate them. 
Evidence suggests that the psychological 
machinery dedicated to performing these tasks of 
acquisition, compliance, and enforcement 
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exhibits many of the characteristics of so-called 
System 1 cognition, especially domain specificity 
and automaticity (Kahneman, 2011). Together 
these allow the norm system to operate alongside 
of and with some degree of independence from 
other psychological processes, including practical 
reasoning, reflective deliberation, and conscious 
volition. 
Putting this thumbnail sketch of a norm 
system together with the characterizations of 
“internalized norms” offered above suggests a 
straightforward interpretation: a person has 
internalized a rule once it has come to be 
represented in her norm system, once it is 
acquired and stored in this specific part of her 
mind. And in virtue of coming to occupy the 
particular functional role carved out by the norm 
system, the rule also thereby gets connected up to 
her motivational apparatus in a special and direct 
way, such that her compliance and enforcement 
of the norm is different from and not merely, in 
the sense spelled out above, instrumental (for 
example, see Fehr & Falk, 2002; Fehr & Gächter, 
2002; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000). Thus, a 
person has internalized those rules that are 
represented in her norm system, and those rules 
are imputed with what can be called intrinsic 
normative motivation.2 Unlike incentivized 
norms, norms that have been internalized activate 
their associated behavioral tendencies directly, 
bypassing—and thus independently of—practical 
reasoning. Indeed, since the influence of a 
person’s internalized norms on her behavior is 
typically not mediated by practical reasoning or 
 
2 Though it is not an uncommon locution, it is 
surprisingly tricky to say exactly what might be meant 
by calling motivation intrinsic other than: “not 
instrumental”. The terms “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” 
are obviously not specific to motivation, emotion, or 
even psychology; like “internal” and “external”, or 
“endogenous” or “exogenous”, they merely mark their 
subject matter as falling on one side or another of some 
boundary. As noted above, there’s an important sense 
in which all motivating states are “internal” to a 
person’s mind. Moreover, use of these terms in 
cognitive science is complicated by the recent debates 
over active and passive externalism and the rise in 
visibility of different accounts of embodied, 
embedded, and extended cognition, all of which have 
blurred the boundary between what is internal and 
reflective decision making, that influence will 
often have to be inhibited if she is to refrain from 
acting on the rule.3 
One last note: the categories of incentivized 
and internalized norms do not exhaust the ways 
that rules can be represented in the human mind 
or connected to motivation and behavior. People 
can merely cognize rules. They can know about 
rules without being in any way motivated to 
enforce or keep their own behavior in line them. 
For example, a fan may have an exhaustive 
knowledge of the NBA rule book even though he 
never plays basketball himself, or a scholar of 
Ancient Greece may have spent a lifetime 
developing an encyclopedic knowledge of the 
norms that governed social life in the heyday of 
Sparta. Despite their expertise, in neither case are 
the respective rules internalized in the sense at 
issue here. People can also create and adopt their 
own rules. Avowed norms are those that an 
individual voluntarily imposes on himself, 
typically after explicitly formulating, reflecting 
on, and deliberately endorsing them. When a 
person, say, chooses to stop drinking, or decides 
to write in a journal for 30 minutes every day, he 
adopts a rule he will try to satisfy and stay 
committed to going forward. This capacity to 
choose, endorse, and follow our own rules is 
crucial for self-determination and identity 
formation, and is of great interest to philosophers 
concerned with agency and autonomy (Callard, 
2018; Ismael, 2016; Korsgaard, 2009).4 There is 
also reason to think that avowed norms are 
undergirded by psychological machinery and 
external to minds in general. Future research is needed 
to help clarify the issue. 
3 Internalized norms may produce an eccentric 
phenomenology as well. For instance, Stanford (2018) 
notes that from a subjective point of view, some norms 
exhibit a “puzzling combination of objective and 
subjective elements” (p. 2). Ramstead et al. (2016) 
develop a notion of “cultural affordance” that provides 
what appears to be a promising way of capturing how 
a person’s internalized norms can influence her first-
person perspective. 
4 To put this point more carefully, individuals are at 
least able to choose some of the rules they are bound 
by; see Witt (2011) and Davidson and Kelly (2018) for 
discussions that distinguish between norms that an 
individual embraces voluntarily versus those that she 





motivational resources that are quite distinct from 
those associated with the norm system (for longer 
discussion, see Kelly, forthcoming). 
 
Four Views on the Nature of Normative 
Motivations 
Having clarified my subject matter, my 
question can be further fleshed out: How do 
internalized norms reliably produce the 
compliance and punishment behaviors associated 
with them? What is the nature and character of 
intrinsic normative motivations? How are these 
psychological states related to other, more 
familiar or better understood motivational states 
contained in human minds? 
The sentimentalist tradition in philosophy has 
inspired a recently influential line of empirical 
work in moral psychology that can speak to these 
questions. This perspective has been fruitful, 
helping to generate evidence that many important 
norm-guided behaviors and evaluations are 
driven by specific emotions like anger, contempt, 
disgust, or shame (Haidt et al., 2001; Nichols, 
2004; Rozin et al., 1999; c.f. Prinz, 2009).5 Many 
versions of this view see these normative 
behaviors and evaluations as being infused by the 
particular character of the specific emotion to 
which they are connected. For example, 
witnessing the violation of an internalized norm 
that is connected to anger will motivate a piece of 
behavior that drives the witness to sanction the 
transgression, but her sanctioning behavior will 
also be inflected with many of the characteristics 
associated with paradigmatic instance of anger in 
general (approach tendencies, heightened 
arousal, perhaps the distinctive facial expression). 
Much of this work also assumes a (common but 
also contested) view of basic emotions: there are 
only a handful of them, they are relatively 
discrete, they are humanly universal and have 
deep evolutionary roots, and they are themselves 
psychologically basic and intrinsically 
motivating (Ekman, 1992; Izard, 2007; Ledoux, 
 
5 Much of this work also recognizes different 
categories of behavior-guiding rules. Moreover, many 
researchers identify those rules that enjoy some kind 
of tight connection to basic emotions as moral norms; 
see especially Nichols (2004). 
2012; Panksepp & Watt, 2011; Panksepp & 
Biven, 2012). 
This perspective suggests what can be called 
the Basic Emotions View; it is really a family of 
views, but I’ll consolidate for ease of discussion. 
The view suggests straightforward answers to the 
questions about normative motivations. It 
acknowledges that not all of the rules a person 
cognizes are connected to basic emotions, but 
those that are typically inherit many features of 
the emotion to which they are connected, 
including, most importantly, the emotion’s 
intrinsic motivating force.6 Translating this into 
the terminology developed in the last section 
implies that internalized norms are those that are 
intrinsically motivating, and an intrinsically 
motivated norm gets its motivational force from 
the basic emotion to which it is connected. The 
Basic Emotions View also suggests another key 
task performed by the norm system, namely that 
of executing a bundling function of pairing up 
each rule it acquires with (on this view) one of the 
basic emotions. The norm system thus draws on 
motivational resources endogenous to and made 
available by basic emotions, but directs and 
shapes them it in new and important ways as well. 
The emotion is thus transformed on both ends. 
Upstream, its appraisal conditions will be 
modified, as the set of cues that activate the 
emotion will be expanded to include those 
specified by the compliance and violation 
conditions for the norm. Downstream, the 
psychological combination of a rule with its 
associated basic emotion will channel the 
motivational force rooted in the emotion (along 
with some of its more resilient characteristics) 
into the specific compliance and punishment 
behaviors encoded in the rule. 
A second kind of view takes this template and 
liberates it from the emotions. The Multiple 
Building Blocks View holds onto the account of 
the norm system and its bundling function, but 
expands the set of motivational building blocks it 
can recruit. The view can take many forms, 
6 See Kelly (2011, 2013) for this kind of account of 
purity norms and the emotion of disgust, worked out 
in terms of a byproduct hypothesis concerning the 
emotion and norms it gets co-opted to help motivate. 
Violators of purity norms are often thought of as not 
just wrong but tainted and contaminating. 
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depending on what a theorist includes on the list 
of resources from which the norm system is able 
draw. For instance, it might be the case that some 
internalized norms are paired with and inherit the 
motivational force not of basic emotions but of 
intrinsically motivating mental states like desires, 
preferences, or attitudes (Arpaly & Schroeder, 
2014; Bicchieri, 2016; c.f. Brennan et al., 2013). 
Alternatively, theorists could appeal to 
motivational building blocks that take the form of 
other dedicated psychological systems.7 A 
plausible set of candidates here are mechanisms 
associated with social learning. Evidence 
suggests that humans are natural social learners 
(Laland, 2017; Mathew & Perreault, 2015), and 
are outfitted with dedicated and early emerging 
psychological machinery that induces young 
children to spontaneously imitate (and often 
overimitate) others (Hoehl et al., 2019). This suite 
of mechanisms appears to be equipped with the 
kind of intrinsically motivating resources the 
norm system could easily recruit, especially to 
ensure people conform to norm-governed 
behaviors they observe, and thus to comply with 
the norms that they internalize (Kenward et al., 
2011; Kenward, 2012; Keupp et al., 2013). The 
capacity for spontaneous and intuitive imitation 
seems to emerge in tandem with core elements of 
the capacity for norms as well (Schmidt, Butler et 
al., 2016; Schmidt, Rakoczy et al., 2011; Schmidt 
& Tomasello, 2012; Vaish et al., 2016). While it 
seems a relatively easy step to go from behavior 
imitation to norm compliance, it is less clear how 
appeal to social learning capacities might account 
for intrinsic motivations to enforce norms and 
punish transgressors. However, the Multiple 
Building Blocks View is amenable to the 
possibility that for any given internalized norm, 
the intrinsic motivation to comply is supplied by 
a different psychological building block than the 
intrinsic motivation to enforce.8 
 
7 For example, see Blair’s (1995) appeal to a violence 
inhibition mechanism (VIM); see Nichols (2004, 
chapter 1) for critical discussion. 
8 Stich (2019) interprets Henrich (2015) as suggesting 
something along these lines when he characterizes a 
proto-norm as “a culturally transmitted (i.e., socially 
learned) package of psychological states that includes: 
(i) a desire to engage in a certain pattern of behavior 
On any version of these two views, normative 
motivations will not be primitive. Rather, these 
motivations will get their identity as normative 
motivations in virtue of the roles they have been 
recruited to play in the norm system: to ensure 
reliable compliance with and enforcement of 
internalized rules. But the intrinsic motivational 
force that those recruited resources bring to bear 
on their new functions is antecedent to their being 
bundled together with their associated norm. This 
result seems to straightforwardly hold on a third 
view as well, which can be called the Basic Affect 
View. This kind of picture, inspired by recent 
work by Lisa Feldman Barrett and her colleagues, 
suggests that affect itself is a (perhaps the) basic 
psychological primitive: normative motivations 
are not primitive states to be sure, but neither are 
emotions like disgust, anger or shame. None of 
these are fundamental components of human 
minds, but are rather constructed out of more 
basic psychological elements, namely affect and 
perhaps a propensity to copy others’ affective 
tendencies. (see especially Barrett & Bliss-
Moreau, 2009, but also Barrett, 2006a, 2006b, 
2017, and Duncan & Barrett, 2007). Application 
of this perspective to norms and norm-guided 
behavior is in its infancy (see Theriault et al 
2020), but it suggests a promising pathway for 
future research 
The Basic Emotions View, the Multiple 
Building Blocks View, and the Basic Affect View 
all depict internalized norms not as being driven 
by the type of slow, deliberate, effortful cognition 
associated with reflective reasoning and fully 
conscious deliberation. Nor, however, do they 
depict the norm system as an ancient or 
foundational platform of mammalian or primate 
minds. Rather, they all portray it as a middle tier 
kludge9, an evolutionary latecomer imposed by a 
tinkering Mother Nature on a more basic 
motivational repertoire, the elements of which it 
harnesses and bundles and channels and thereby 
under specified circumstances; (ii) a desire that other 
people do the same; and (iii) an emotion elicitor that 
leads to an agonistic emotion (typically anger or 
disgust) when one becomes aware that another person 
is not behaving in the desired way. These emotions can 
and sometimes do lead to punitive behavior directed at 
people who do not behave in the desired way” (p. 8). 





transforms. An interesting upshot of these views 
is that as the norm system recruits more basic 
motivational states, it does not leave them 
completely unchanged. Rather, the norm system 
imposes new tasks on the component parts it 
recruits, and as those parts are integrated into the 
functioning of this larger embedding system, their 
operations are tailored so that they are better able 
to perform their newly acquired functions. These 
more basic motivational states often remain 
recognizable even as they are pressed into novel 
roles, retaining their identity even as they are 
repurposed and transfigured by their new 
circumstances.10 
A fourth and final possibility diverges from 
this general picture and holds that normative 
motivations are in fact basic. According to a 
Basic Normative Motivations View, available and 
endogenous to the norm system is a form of 
distinctive intrinsic motivation that it can pair 
with an acquired rule, and that the norm system 
can access without having to do any recruiting 
outside of itself. On this view, the norm system 
does not require any further resources in order to 
provide intrinsic motivation to an internalized 
norm.11 
Such a view seems clearly coherent. What 
would it take to show that it is true? What kinds 
of arguments and evidence could be marshalled 
in favor of it? This deserves more careful 
consideration than I can deliver here, but I will 
end by pointing to a useful template. In his paper 
“Basic Questions”, Carruthers (2018) argues that 
curiosity and questioning attitudes are primitive, 
foundational components of human and animal 
minds. He construes curiosity as “an affective 
(desire-like or emotion-like) motivational state 
whose content is a question” (p. 136); a proponent 
of the Basic Normative Motivations View might 
similarly construe an internalized norm as an 
affective motivational state whose content is an 
injunction. The proponent could then follow 
Carruthers’ playbook of trying to establish that 
 
10 See Anderson (2014) for a convincing argument 
that the kind of “reuse” described here is the rule 
rather than the exception in the brain, and Richerson 
and Boyd (2001) for an account of how 
evolutionary pressures that selected for abilities to 
coordinate and cooperate at larger scales ended up 
remodeling human social psychology.  
such internalized norms are likewise foundational 
by showing that the psychological machinery 
underlying such norms have a deep phylogenetic 
history. 
Carruthers looks to comparative psychology 
to make the case that curiosity-like states are 
found in a variety of other animals. This 
argumentative strategy is worth pursuing for 
internalized norms as well. It might be more of an 
uphill battle, however. The most widely accepted 
view currently seems to be that the full range of 
social behaviors associated with a psychological 
capacity dedicated to norms are not found among 
other animals, and that the norm system itself 
does not have a long evolutionary history, but is 
indeed uniquely human (for example see Boyd, 
2017; Riedl et al., 2012). However, those working 
on animal cognition have begun pushing back on 
this (Andrews, 2020; Fitzpatrick, under revision; 
Vincent et al., 2019; von Rohr et al., 2011). 
In addition to these comparative arguments, 
there are more general evolutionary grounds for 
taking seriously the possibility that human 
normative motivation is a relatively recent 
adaptation not shared with other animals, and is a 
sui generis, psychologically primitive component 
of our minds. Modern human beings are the 
product of uniquely powerful forms of gene-
culture coevolution and cumulative niche 
construction (Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Stotz 
2010). Normative motivations that are both 
distinctively human and psychologically basic 
may have been installed in our minds by the kinds 
of culture-driven genetic selective pressures that 
have recently (in evolutionary time) driven our 
species down its unique evolutionary pathway 
(Henrich 2015; Sterelny, 2012). Exploring this 
possibility empirically may have to rely on an 
argument from exclusion and proceed by a kind 
of process of elimination, ruling out possible 
explanations in which the behaviors and intrinsic 
motivations associated with an internalized norm 
are accounted for by appeal to some other 
11 Such a view is at least suggested by Sripada and 
Stich (2007), whose boxological model depicts the 
compliance and punitive motivations associated with 
internalized norms as distinct from emotion systems, 
which are represented by their own, separate box. 
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identifiable source, be it another psychological 
system (for imitation, for more sophisticated 
forms of social learning, for anger or disgust), or 
some other mental state (a desire, attitude, affect 
etc.). Once more fine-grained hypotheses about 
normative motivations have been formulated, 
emerging brain scan technologies and new 
experimental techniques will surely help enrich 
investigations as well. 
 
Conclusion 
Even if this last view turns out to be false and 
normative motivations are not psychologically 
primitive, they can still be psychologically 
special in interesting and important ways. For 
example, normative motivation can still pick a 
category of mental state that, while not basic, is 
nevertheless distinctive in the sense that appeals 
to normative motivations as such—rather than 
merely to the more primitive building blocks they 
are constructed out of—may be indispensable for 
explaining large swaths of human behavior, 
especially those related to large scale 
coordination, cooperation, and morality. 
I have my suspicions about many of these 
issues, but no definitive answers or impregnable 
arguments to offer. I hope to have made some 
headway clarifying some of the conceptual 
landscape and drawing attention to the exciting 
questions that work on norm psychology 
continues to raise about normative motivation 
and its connection to affect and emotion. 
Formulating questions is often a prelude to 
progress, if not a kind of progress itself. 
Inevitably questions raise more questions, too. 
For example, how could we make psychological 
sense of the idea suggested by some mathematical 
models that internalization comes in degrees, 
with “oversocialized” individuals internalizing 
their norms more fully than those who are 
“undersocialized” (Gavrilets & Richerson, 
2017)? How is the dimension of over- and under-
socialization related to the dimension of tightness 
and looseness recently explored by Gelfand and 
her colleagues (Gelfand et al., 2011)? How and 
by what mechanisms do the kinds of norms that a 
person has already internalized affect their ability 
to internalize new norms (Hagger et al., 2014)? 
These too are fascinating questions, and I can’t 
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